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Brief of Paper on International Communism, 9 November 1954

- 1. Finished intelligence on international communism should be substantially increased. Location of primary responsibility for such production needs to be identified.
- 2. Policy makers need advice as to the relative position and influence of the Communist Party in various countries as well as the relationship of national communism to international communism. Consumers other than policy makers are principally the operators.
- 3. Detailed functional studies are needed by operators. The philosopy and philosophers, who are developing both national and international communism, are receiving inadequate coverage in Government as well as private scholarship. (See point 1 in basic paper at 1st paper clip.)
- 4. A new staff in DD/P would have to be created to deal with operational intelligence production on international communism. The provision of the intelligence products to foreign official, quasi-official and non-official organizations needs to be considered as a covert operation.
 - 5. The intelligence production activities are:

a. for policymakers (NIE, NIS, etc.),

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b. for operators

and

c. basic operational research.

Two relevant operational functions are

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- a. support of covert operations and
- b. provision of intelligence on communism to foreign organizations.

At present the production of intelligence for policymakers is done by OIR, for operators basic operational research is not done. The two operational functions are done in CIA. Location of responsibility depends on answers to the following questions.

- a. Can international communism be unambigiously isolated from other political and social disciplines?
- b. What is the best location of the producers vis-a-vis the consumers of the intelligence?
- c. Can the 5 intelligence production and operational activities separable from one another or could all be handled in one

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- 6. Operational intelligence production can be performed effectively only by a staff in the DD/P because only there would it have easy access to raw material.
- 7. Intelligence on international communism is already the responsibility of OTR which is organized on a country basis. Since international communism is, in a sense, an aggregate of mational communisms with the leavening effect of the Kremlin added, OTR would seem to be the logical place for the intelligence production for policymakers.
- 8. The intensive long range research on communism is more difficult to locate, but it appears that CIA is where it belongs. In CIA, the staff required for this research would be less in competition with the very policymakers who would be the main customers and therefore more acceptable to them. (See point 2). There are other advantages to locating the staff in CIA. (See point 3).
- 9. Owing to the obvious overlap of the 3 intelligence production and 2 operational functions, it would be highly advantageous to have a close physical and administrative relationship of the staffs doing the research.
- 10. It would be desirable to farm out much of the research to private institutions instead of building up more government staff. Many of the best scholars on communism are, for one reason or another, unclearable. Close guidance by the government would be necessary, and mechanisms for such guidance already exist. The existence and field of interest of the government staff should be publicized so as to be a point of contact for scholars and institutions on the subject. (See point 4).
- 11. OIR should continue to produce finished intelligence on international communism of general nature on a country-by-country basis, and CIA should be responsible for the operational and basic long-range intelligence. The senior research and policy staff should be in CIA (DD/P). The operational staff should be the primary source of detailed and specific intelligence on communism for all purposes not just for the operators. The senior staff would have influence in proportion to the reputation it builds. (See point 5). Dissemination to foreign customers would be carried out by the operational planning staff.

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Briefed by Asst. to DD/I (Planning), 17 November 1954

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
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Notes:

1. The proposed organization appears to be



- 2. Research in depth would be done by the operational intelligence staff. Its product would be used by OIR to produce intelligence where the focus was clearly on the country rather than communism as a world movement. Is there a competition between the senior staff and ONE? (See point 5).
- 3. On the whole, the conclusions are sound. If the primary producing component (operational intelligence staff) were placed any place other than DD/P, there would be difficulty overcoming the normal DD/P resistence to access to operational information. OIR as the proper place to produce the country-by-country studies is logical. The use of external research is of obvious value.
- 4. My only question on the total proposed is -- DD/I is charged with production of "finished intelligence;" is this a foot in the door for DD/P to produce "finished intelligence?"